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Abstract
In many durable goods industries, ﬁrms continuously offer new products to customers and
market them in different versions through different channel of distribution. This paper examines
the issue of when to introduce the product into the different channels. The determinants of entry
time include the discounting of future proﬁts, the foresight of the ﬁrm, customers’ expectations,
and the possibility of cannibalization. Of special interest is the effect of customers’ expectations
about the timing of sequential entries. Speciﬁcally, it is shown here that proﬁts decline if ﬁrms
ignore the role of customer expectations. We discuss how our results can be used to get insights
into the workings of the US motion picture industry, which is characterized by sequential intro-
duction of movies ﬁrst into theaters followed by home video. Finally, a closed form solution for
an optimal sequential timing policy is provided.
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It is frequently observed that when firms introduce products to the market in multiple 
versions, they follow a pattern of introducing the high-margin version first, followed, after a delay, 
by the low-margin version. Several examples of such a pattern may be cited. Six months after the 
theatrical release of a movie, it is re-released on videos for home consumption (Childs 1992). 
Paperback versions of books are released after about a year of their hardback release (Wilson and 
Norton 1989). High quality cars, computers and cameras are introduced before their corresponding 
lower quality versions. And fashion houses, such as Armani, introduce designs sequentially into 
lower price outlets after every fashion season (Pesendorfer 1995).
In all these examples, there are no developmental constraints preventing the release of 
both versions simultaneously, but the firm chooses to introduce the high-margin version first. An 
obvious motivation for this choice is that introduction strategies can influence profits substantially. 
Since the versions are substitutes, the advantage of sequential introduction is that there is less 
cannibalization of the high-margin version by the low-margin one. The disadvantage is that firms 
have to discount their earnings from the low-margin version to a greater extent. It would appear 
that this advantage and disadvantage can be traded off to obtain an optimal entry time for the low 
margin version, and much of the product introduction timing literature in marketing has followed 
this approach (e.g. Mahajan and Muller 1996, Norton and Bass 1987, Wilson and Norton 1989). 
However,  in  many  industries,  including  those  cited  above,  cannibalization  is  not  the  only 
determinant of introduction time. 
An  interesting  feature  in  these  industries  is  the  repeated  nature  of  the  problem.  For 
example,  a  publisher  faces  the  paperback  timing  decision  with  every  new  book,  and  movie 
distributors with every new movie. In such cases, sequential entry decisions are likely to influence 
customers’ expectations about sequential entry in the future. Customers act on the expectations 
they form about future introduction times based on the firm’s past behavior. Only after taking this 
into consideration can the firm properly maximize profits with its choice of introduction times. 
The goal of this paper is to study the role of expectations in entry decisions and, thereby, the 
optimal introduction strategy for the product.  
This paper shows that by ignoring customer expectations, the existing theoretical literature 
prescribes a less profitable outcome for the firm, and over time results in the two versions of each 
product  being  introduced  closer  and  closer  to  each  other  until,  finally,  they  are  introduced 
simultaneously. A better outcome is achieved by taking customer expectations into consideration. 
But,  even  then,  it  will  be  seen  that  achieving  the  best  outcome  depends  on  the  sequential 
introduction strategies of other firms in the industry and may, therefore, be unachievable without 
industry coordination.
Industry coordination may explain an interesting observation about entry timing in many 
industries. There is often a standard “window” of time between introductions of the low margin 
and high margin versions. This observation cannot be explained by cannibalization arguments 
since, in that case, the window would depend on the particular product — book or movie — rather 
than a standard window for all books or movies. For example, Wilson and Norton (1989) argue 
that a book that has done well in hardcover should be given a longer opportunity to sell before it 
faces competition from paperback than a book that has not done so well. For a similar reason, 
Lehmann and Weinberg (2000) conclude that the observed small variance of windows in the movie 
industry implies a suboptimal policy. However, the results in this paper offer an explanation based 
on  customer  expectations  for  why  different  firms  in  an  industry  might  follow  a  common 
introduction timing practice across products. 
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US motion picture industry. The industry is characterized by multiple versions of each movie and 
repeated interaction between firms and customers. Another advantage in using the movie industry 
as  an  example  is  its  importance  as  the  primary  entertainment  industry  and  a  major  cultural 
influence in our society. Due to these factors, there has been increasing theoretical investigation of 
the  movie  industry  in  the  marketing  literature  recently  (e.g.  Eliashberg  and  Sawhney  1994, 
Eliashberg and Shugan 1997, Krider and Weinberg 1998, Lehmann and Weinberg 2000). We add 
to  this  emerging  body  of  literature  by  providing  an  analysis  of  the  crucial  role  of  customer 
expectation and applying it to the sequencing of movie and video release times. 
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section an overview of the movie industry is 
presented  and  the  relevant  literature  is  summarized.  Thereafter,  the  model  is  developed  and 
analyzed.  The  subsequent  section  discusses  the  results  and  also  derives  the  optimal  constant 
window. Finally, conclusions and directions for future research are presented.
2. INDUSTRY BACKGROUND & LITERATURE
This section presents a summary of the movie industry’s distribution practices for product 
entry with a view to identifying the different actors, their concerns, and the dynamics of their 
interaction. The practices are representative of the industries being examined. The release pattern 
for movies is described in Childs (1992, p.331) as follows:
“Three or four months into theatrical is release to airlines and non-residential 
pay-per-view (hotels). On the first day of the seventh month is the home video 
release. Put another way, the video “window” starts on the seventh month after 
theatrical  release.  By  this  time,  of  course,  the  picture  is  usually  played  out 
theatrically. Within thirty to sixty days of home video release is home pay-per-
view… Next, free cable is released six to nine months after home video, followed 
by TV syndication or network release.”
The  logic  of  this  sequential  introduction  strategy  is  that  the  movie  is  distributed  to 
ancillary markets in order of descending revenue per viewer (Quelch, Hibbard and Yao 1990). 
Theater and video releases deserve the primary attention. This is because the revenue potential of 
video is much larger than that of the other non-theatrical channels, and therefore, the impact on the 
profitability of the movie due to improvements in its release strategy should be correspondingly 
greater. Video revenues, from 1986 onwards, have exceeded theatrical revenues to become the 
major revenue source for movies (Dale 1997). In comparison to the theater and video channels, 
other channels constitute minor revenue sources. The Digital Video Disk (DVD) and videocassette 
are both referred to as video.  
The  movie  distributor,  or  studio,  licenses  the  movie  for  theatrical  exhibition  through 
bidding or negotiation, to exhibitors, for a certain number of days (Goldberg 1991). The distributor 
gets  a  percentage  of  the  net  theater  receipts,  or  some  weekly  minimum  percentage  of  gross, 
whichever  is  higher  (Goldberg  1991).  The  percentage  split  between  the  distributor  and  the 
exhibitor is based on a sliding scale, with the distributor getting the larger portion during the early 
part of the release and the exhibitor getting the larger portion during the later part (Goldberg 1991, 
Sills and Axelrod 1989). This ensures that the exhibitor has an incentive to keep the movie playing 
even after sales decline, and not replace it with a new movie too soon. All the profits from food 
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(Friedberg 1992).
The distributor sells or licenses the video rights of the movie to video distributors. The 
selling price, or license fee, depends upon the sales expectations of the video (Goldberg 1991). 
The  video  distributor  then  sells  videos  to  rental  outlets,  such  as  Blockbuster,  to  rent  out  to 
individual viewers.
The theatrical run of a movie is usually over within three months, but the industry norm is 
to introduce the home video six months after the movie’s release in theaters (Childs 1992, Wiese 
1989). The trade literature does not provide much explanation for the resulting three month gap 
when  neither  version is available in the market. One explanation is that the movie should be 
‘rested’ before its video release to avoid overexposing it (Quelch, Hibbard and Yao 1990). But this 
explanation is clearly incomplete since high awareness of the movie helps video sales. A longer 
delay also results in higher discounting of video revenues and, possibly, additional interest charges 
on production costs of the movie that may not have been fully recovered from box office receipts. 
Other explanations, such as using an early release to deter piracy in international markets, waiting 
for Oscar nominations, waiting till peak demand seasons, specially winter when Christmas VCR 
sales and cold weather boost video rentals, and a desire to avoid competitive releases (Goldberg 
1991, Weise 1989), are specific to a few cases and do not provide a consistent explanation. Thus, 
the question of when the video should be introduced is unanswered in the trade literature.
In the academic literature, the entry timing problem has been well recognized (e.g. Norton 
and Bass 1987, Moorthy and Png 1992). However, the implications of existing research do not 
appear to apply directly to the industry practices just described. Several articles in the marketing 
literature have dealt with product introduction timing in the diffusion of innovations context using 
the trade-off between cannibalization and discounted future profits (Kalish 1985, Lehmann and 
Weinberg 1998, Mahajan and Muller 1996, Norton and Bass 1987, Wilson and Norton 1989). For 
example,  Mahajan  and  Muller  (1996)  develop  a  “Now  or  at  Maturity”  rule  for  optimally 
introducing a new generation of products. Applied to our situation, this rule suggests that the video 
should either be introduced simultaneously with the movie or just prior to its withdrawal from the 
theaters. But, in practice, video is never introduced while the movie is still playing in theaters.
Other papers have considered the product introduction problem in a two period setting that 
allows for a comparison of simultaneous and sequential strategies. A sequential release will be 
preferred to a simultaneous release when cannibalization is a problem and customers are relatively 
more impatient than the firm (Moorthy and Png 1992). The two period model can also be used to 
model  expectations  (e.g.  Dhebar  1994).  However,  our  need  is  to  compare  between  sequential 
strategies. Unlike the two period models, we use a continuous time model to distinguish more 
finely between possible introduction strategies and to compare sequential strategies in a multi-
stage infinite horizon game. 
3. CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS
There are two groups of decision makers; the distributors and the customers. We take the 
distributors’  perspective.  Although  the  producer  makes  the  movie,  the distributor finances the 
project and then distributes the completed product. The distributor has control over marketing 
variables such as promotions, advertising and, most importantly for present purposes, the release 
dates of the movie in the theater and in video. Let t denote time. We use the following timeline:
t=Tn The time at which the movie is introduced into theater, i.e., theatrical release. 
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n Customers’ expectations of the video release time. Based on their expectation of 
the time they will have to wait for the video, some customers may decide to view 
the movie in theater, while others wait for the video. 
t= Tn+￿n The time at which the video is actually introduced. ￿n is called the theater-to-video 
(or theater) window since, for this duration, theaters face no competition from 
video. The customers who had waited for the video can now view it. Based on the 
observation of ￿n, customers update their expectations to ￿
e
n+1 for the next movie.  
Here, n is the subscript for each movie, n = {0,1,2,..,￿}. The subscript will be dropped for 
convenience  and  we  will  let  Tn=0  when  it  is  clear  that  a  single  movie  is  being  discussed. 
Consumers are assumed to hold common expectations about the time of release of the video. 
Expectations are adaptive since they are updated based on past experience. The expectations could 
be rational, implying that the expected and actual entry times are the same. However, this would 
not show the sequence of convergence to the equilibrium and the additional insights this provides. 
It should be noted, however, that assuming rational expectations would yield the same equilibrium 
results as in this paper.
Distributors
The  decision  variables  available  to  the  distributor  are  the  video  release  timing  and 
advertising.  Typically,  the  advertising  strategy  is  to  advertise  extensively  and  create  word-of-
mouth prior to the movie being released in theaters (Mahajan, Muller and Kerin 1986, Wiese 
1989). The expenditure on video advertising is very small. Given the practice of all production, 
advertising and marketing expenditures being made prior to the launch of the movie, they will be 
treated as fixed costs. 
The video release depends on the margins on video and theater sales. The distributor’s 
margin per customer is higher for theater sales than for video. Vogel (1994, p.48) notes that the 
distributor margin on theater tickets is from $3.50 to $1.50, while for video it may be as low as 20 
to 30 cents. When calculating the margin for video, the gross margin is divided by the average 
number of people who view it together. The notation for the distributor’s price margins are:
Pm(t) The margin per theater customer. The revenue sharing scale between distributors 
and exhibitors is assumed to be linear, i.e., Pm(t)=Pm-bt, b￿0.
Pv The margin per video customer, where Pv<Pm.
The objective of the distributor is to maximize profits. Let F denote the fixed costs of 
production and marketing. Profits on a movie are 
￿(￿
e, ￿) = M(￿
e, ￿) + V(￿
e, ￿) – F. (1)
M(￿
e, ￿) The total theatrical revenue from the movie. It is a function of ￿ only because the 
video may be released while the movie is still playing in theaters resulting in 
cannibalization of movie revenues.
V(￿
e, ￿) The total video revenue.
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The customers’ decision, after deciding to view the movie, is whether to view it in the 
theatrical or the video format. We assume a continuum of buyers whose behavior can be modeled 
in the aggregate by a continuous product adoption distribution over time. Most movies show a 
decay of sales with time (Krider and Weinberg 1998, Mahajan, Muller and Kerin 1984, Sawhney 
and Eliashberg 1996). We use the following notation:
m(￿
e,t) The distribution of theater adopters over time, assuming no cannibalization occurs. 
m(￿
e,t) is decreasing in t and increasing in ￿
e. It is assumed to be differentiable in 
its arguments.
This is a general decreasing function of sales with time, resulting possibly from some 
internal dynamic, e.g., negative word-of-mouth (Mahajan, Muller and Kerin 1984). It would be a 
worthwhile endeavor to obtain this distribution from a utility framework, by modeling the explicit 
interactions of consumers through word-of-mouth, pricing and network effects (e.g., Dhebar and 
Oren 1985). However, we model it only at the aggregate level, assuming a quite general form that 
might be generated by a variety of internal dynamics. The dependence on ￿
e in the distribution 
stems from the customers’ disutility of waiting for the video release. If the expected time of release 
is  increased,  fewer  people  are  likely  to  wait  for  the  video  ceteris  paribus.  Figure  1  gives  a 
depiction of the sales over time at different expectations of video release for the same movie. As 
shown, m(￿
e, t) is increasing in ￿
e, i.e., at any point in time t, m(￿
e
1, t) > m(￿
e





Figure 1: Distribution of Theater Adopters with Time (t)
 and with Expectation of Video Release Date (￿
e)
The total movie potential consists of customers who will go to either the theater or the 
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segments are referred to as movie loyals, video loyals and switchers respectively.
N The total potential. It comprises of loyal theater viewers (Nm), loyal video viewers 
(Nv) and switchers (Ns).
S(￿
e) The number of switchers who decide to wait for the video. We have S(￿
e)￿[0, Ns] 
and S(0) = Ns.  S’(￿
e) is negative and S’’(￿
e) is positive.









(, ) () ￿￿ . (2)
Equation 2 states that if there is no cannibalization, the number of theater customers is the 
sum of movie loyals, Nm, and those switchers who decide to view the movie in theaters, Ns-S(￿
e). 
By definition, switchers will watch the video if it is available. If the video is released while the 
movie is still on exhibition, any remaining switchers are cannibalized. On the other hand, the 
distribution of theater loyals is unaffected by the release of the video. Therefore, in the analysis 
below, there is no loss of generality in ignoring theater loyals, since they are not affected by ￿. For 
convenience, it will be assumed henceforth that theater loyals are incorporated into the fixed term 
F, so that m(￿,￿) denotes only switchers. 
The revenue from the sale of video rights is a one-time lump sum payment that is assumed 
to equal the present value of the number of video rentals multiplied by the margin per rental. There 
are several reasons for considering the video revenue to be a lump sum payment. The distributor 
makes a license sale to video distributors. The video distributors make an outright sale to retailers, 
so that the revenue per copy is realized immediately (Goldberg 1991). The major demand for 
rental video is in the period shortly following its release (Wallach 1992). It is likely, since retailers 
buy a large number of copies to meet the initial demand, that they would have excess copies on 
hand after the demand slacks off. The sales to retailers later are, therefore, quite small. 
For each movie, expanding equation 1, the following profit equation is obtained:
￿ ￿




Theater    Revenue Video     Revenue
( , ) ( ) ( , ) [ ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ]
e rt e r c e e e
m v v m
t












Fixed    Cost
F ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
(3)
The features of this equation are now discussed.
• The  parameters  and  variables  may  be  unique  to  each  movie  (i.e.  subscripted  n)  without 
affecting the initial analysis (Propositions 1-4). Thereafter, additional assumptions are made to 
account for revenues from movies that have not yet been released.
• The  first  integral  is  the  total  revenue  from  the  theater  channel,  M(￿
e,  ￿).  The  sales  are 
discounted at a rate r>0, and the margin Pm(t), also weighs initial sales at a higher rate.
• The second term is the total video revenue, V(￿
e, ￿). The revenue is obtained as a lump sum 
and is discounted due to the delay ￿.
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parameter combines with the discount rate, r>0, to capture the degree to which video revenues 
are effectively discounted.
• Repurchases and word-of-mouth are captured by the parameter ￿. This parameter ties video 
sales to the success of the movie in theater. Whether a theater goer repurchases the video or 
influences, via word-of-mouth, a person who would otherwise not have rented the video to rent 
it are mathematically identical. 
• The terms inside the square brackets are, respectively, the number of video loyals Nv, the 
number of switchers who decided to wait for the video S(￿
e), the number of switchers who 
wanted to watch the movie in theaters but were cannibalized by the early release of the video, 
the number of switchers who saw the movie in theater and influenced video rentals via word-
of-mouth, and, finally, the number of theater loyals who did the same.
• The presence of m(￿
e,t) under the integral sign in the video profit component does not mean 
that  the  theater  sales  distribution  is  uninterrupted  after  the  video  has  been  introduced.  Its 
purpose is to measure the total number of theater customers cannibalized due to video.
• The  decision  variable  is  ￿,  the  video  introduction  time,  or  window,  for  each  movie.  The 
continuum  of  the  simultaneous  strategy  (￿=0)  and  the  many  possible  sequential  strategies 
(￿>0) is examined and compared.
4. ENTRY TIMING & CUSTOMER EXPECTATIONS
We will show that when ignoring the role of customer expectations, the recommended 
introduction  strategy  of  earlier  research  leads  distributors  to  faster  and  faster  sequential 
introductions, and that this trend is detrimental to their profits.
The Shrinking Window and Profit Erosion
Consider the following analysis involving an individual movie. Customers have an initial 
expectation, ￿
e, about the expected time between movie and video releases. What incentive is there 
for  the  distributor  to  deviate  from  this  expectation?  An  introduction  time  ￿>￿
e  can  never  be 
optimal, because all switchers who went to the theater expected the video to be introduced at ￿
e but 
decided to view the movie in theater anyway. Practically, the movie would have left theaters by ￿
e. 
Therefore, since revenues from the video are being discounted without any corresponding benefits, 
￿>￿
e is not optimal. 
We  now  investigate  if  ￿=￿
e  can  be  optimal  in  a  single  movie.  The  trade-off  that  the 
distributor has to make is solely based on the degree of cannibalization between the two products 
since expectations need not be modeled in an individual-movie analysis. The optimality condition 
is obtained by maximizing the profit function in equation (3). Figure 2 illustrates graphically the 
trade-off that is performed in obtaining the optimal window. 
This figure depicts total revenues as a function of the window ￿. Theater revenue, M(￿
e, ￿), 
increase when ￿ increases because there is less cannibalization, or, if ￿>￿
e, there is no effect on 
revenues, so this function flattens out. Video revenues decrease when ￿ increases for two reasons. 
First, because these revenues are more highly discounted the further they are in the future, and, 
second, because with an increase in ￿, cannibalization decreases. The sum of the revenue curves is 
the total revenue, and this is being maximized with respect to ￿ to yield ￿*.
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Proposition 1 then states the standard result (e.g. Mahajan and Muller’s (1996), ‘Now or at 
Maturity’ result) that the video should ideally be released while the movie is still in theater.  
Proposition 1: With profit maximization for each movie, the optimal time of introduction of the 
video, ￿, is less than its expected time of introduction, ￿
e, except when ￿=￿
e=0.
Proof:  All proofs are in the Appendix.
This result has an appealing intuition. Given that customers expect the video to be released 
￿
e after the movie release, not much movie revenue will be lost by releasing the video a fraction 
earlier, whereas it brings forward the entire stream of profits from video rental. Hence the result.
Consider the situation where the distributor releases multiple movies, so that the firm is 
constantly  interacting  with  customers  in  a  multi-period  game.  If  expectations  are  formed  by 
consumers but ignored by decision makers, the result is given by Proposition 2, i.e., repeated 
application of profit maximization on individual movies results in a convergence to a simultaneous 
introduction strategy.
Proposition  2:  In  the  infinite  horizon  game  with  adaptive  expectations  and  optimization  on 
individual movies, the sequence {￿n}, n={0,..,￿}, converges to simultaneous introduction, which 
is also the rational expectations equilibrium.
A few steps of this process are depicted in Figure 3. It shows the distribution of theater 
revenues and video revenues. The latter, being lump sum payments, are represented as spikes. 
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The importance of this result is that even if the video release is not simultaneous with 
theater release today, there is no reason to assume that simultaneous release is not the equilibrium. 
A shrinking window may be evidence of the fact that the equilibrium has not yet been reached. 
When there is simultaneous introduction, only theater loyals go to the theater, and all the switchers 
view the video. There is no cannibalization of theater goers.
Why are faster sequential introductions undesirable? The next proposition shows that the 
maximum profit is less when a short window is expected. The reasoning is that more customers 
will wait for the low-margin product.
Proposition  3:  In  the  infinite  horizon  game  with  adaptive  expectations  and  optimization  on 
individual movies, the maximum profit function, ￿(￿
e), is increasing in ￿
e.
This implies that the profitability of myopic distributors is compromised by more rapid 
sequential introductions of the video. However, if a distributor knows that a shrinking window and 
declining profits are the result of myopic, individual-movie optimization, can it avoid its fate and 
have an equilibrium strategy that maintains a constant window for each movie? Under certain 
conditions, a non-shrinking, constant, open window can be maintained. For this proof, we assume 




n,  ￿￿(0,1].  Also  that  revenue  from  the 
theater channel is obtained within a short enough interval that it may be left undiscounted. The 
latter scenario is particularly true of the movie industry. On average 25% of a major picture’s 
revenues are taken in the opening weekend (Krider and Weinberg 1998). The total discounted 
profits for the distributor is 
n rT
n e
￿ ￿ ￿  where the nth movie is released at Tn. The optimization is 
conducted over an infinite horizon. A key result is then: 
Proposition 4: A constant window sequential introduction strategy, ￿>0: 
(a) exists as an equilibrium if the rate of adaptation, ￿, is sufficiently high, and the discount rate, 
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rate is sufficiently small, and ￿(￿,￿)>￿(0,0).
Customers  are  required  to  learn  sufficiently  well  from  past  experience.  Otherwise, 
expectations do not change much and few additional people decide to wait for the video following 
a  decrease  in  the  window.  It  is  advantageous  then  to  decrease  the  window.  That  the  spacing 
between movies should be small is intuitively obvious since a distributor with highly infrequent 
releases would be little concerned with future revenues. A distributor with a low discount rate 
would be similarly unconcerned. If the condition |￿￿(￿
e,￿)/￿￿
e| > |￿￿(￿
e,￿)/￿￿| did not hold it would 
mean that profits are less sensitive to expectations than to cannibalization. In this case the optimal 
release strategy would indeed be to continuously shrink the window, that would in the long run 
still lead to ￿=0, but at a less rapid rate. The optimal condition derived in the appendix requires 
numerical solution.
Under certain circumstances, even with a high valuation for future revenues, the shrinking 
window may not be preventable. This is considered next.
Industry-based Expectations
We generalize the analysis so that foresighted distributors maximize the total revenue from 
a stream of movies taking customer expectations into consideration. So far, the effects of other 
firms  in  the  industry  have  not  been  taken  into  account  in  the  optimization,  and  this  is  now 
remedied. It is likely that customer expectations will create externalities between firms, since it is 
unrealistic to presume that customers are sufficiently involved to identify which distributors in the 
industry have shorter theatrical windows. Realistically, expectations are based on the industry’s 
average actions. In that case, we get the following results for a constant window:
Proposition 5: Assuming that the expected time of video release is based on the average actions of 
multiple distributors, we have, for a common constant window strategy, ￿>0:
(a) As the number of distributors increases, (i) if c=0, then the discount rate r must approach 0
for a distributor to sustain the strategy as an equilibrium, (ii) if c>0, then the strategy will not 
be an equilibrium, and the sequence {￿n} converges to a simultaneous introduction.
(b) Distributors that deviate from the strategy earn higher profits than distributors that do not 
deviate.
(c) If distributors believe they have no influence on ￿
e then the sequence {￿n} converges to a 
simultaneous introduction.
The idea here is that individual gains from deviation are personalized whereas losses are 
shared by society, including the deviator. The constant window policy in Proposition 5 requires 
that  the  share  of  losses  for  the  deviator  exceeds  its  individual  gains.  As  its  share  of  losses 
decreases with the number of distributors, avoiding the trap of part (c) of the proposition requires a 
more  and  more  forward  looking  industry  (part  (a)).  Yet,  if  c>0,  there  is  a  minimum  cost  to 
maintaining a constant window that cannot be offset by the diminishing future benefits as the 
number  of  distributors  increases.  Self  maximization  by  firms  is  always  less  optimal  than 
simultaneous maximization if externalities are involved. The externality imposed by a distributor 
is the effect of its actions on customer expectations about the whole industry. Even when their 
products  do  not  compete,  the  action  of  each  firm  affects  other  firms  in  the  industry  through 
customer expectations. 
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there  are  distinguishable  subsets  then  different  expectations  will  emerge  for  each  subset.  For 
example, Disney is usually identified as having a longer window than other distributors. Thus, 
Disney can possibly avoid the externality driven result of the shrinking window in Proposition 4.
In  summary,  it  can  be  stated  that  there  are  several  forces  that  affect  the  size  of  the 
sequential introduction window. Whereas foresighted behavior and fear of cannibalization favor a 
longer window, myopic behavior and the externality of different firms in the industry favor a 
shorter and shrinking window. Table 1 summarizes these results.
Table 1: Summary of Analytical Results
Distributor maximizes profit over: Customer 
expectations 
based on:









Further, Proposition 3 equates a smaller window with reduced profits. Of particular import 
is the bottom right cell that may be said to best satisfy the conditions prevalent in the movie 
industry. 
In  the  US  motion  picture  industry  there  has  been  a  decreasing  trend  in  the  average  
theatrical window over the years. Gordon (1996) notes, “...every year more recent films hit video-
store shelves. In the early ‘80s, the standard window before video was more than a year. By mid-
decade, pictures six month old would go to video if they hadn’t been blockbusters or some element 
of the film was timely.” The decreasing trend was very slow after the mid-eighties and for a long 
period  a  minimum  six  month  window  was  the  industry  norm  (Gordon  1996).  But  this  has 
decreased  again  in  later  years  and  there  have  been  renewed  calls  on  the  industry  for  the  re-
establishment of the constant six month window (Greene 1997, Gordon 1996). For example, the 
National Association of Theater Owners (NATO) has called for stricter adherence to the unspoken 
agreement  between  distributors  and  exhibitors  to  wait  six  months  before  releasing  the  video 
(Steuer 1996). Table 2, presented by NATO (cf. Steuer 1996) shows the decreasing trend in recent 
years. 
Table 2: Average Theater Windows 1993-96
Year Average Window Cum.  Change
1993 6 months 21 days
1994 6 months 12 days - 4.5%
1995 5 months 28 days - 11.4%
1996 5 months 18 days - 16.4%
It  cannot  be  determined  if  shortsightedness  on  the  part  of  the  industry  is  solely  the 
explanation for this shrinkage in the window because there has been another factor which is the 
growth  in  the  revenue  potential  of  video.  This  idea  is  developed  in  the  next  section.  From 
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shrinkage. 
5. THE OPTIMAL CONSTANT WINDOW
Following the results in the previous sections, one may wonder if an open, i.e., non-zero 
window  can  be  achieved  in  practice.  Given  favorable  conditions,  we  show  that  it  can in this 
section. A closed form solution to an optimal constant release sequence, followed by comparative 
statics, then finalizes the analysis.
Two factors are seen in the movie industry by which a constant window equilibrium may 
be obtained, of which we consider only the first:
(a) Commitment: The distributor can make a credible commitment about the video release date. 
But  in  many  situations  establishing  credibility  can  be  a  problem.  One  solution  is  for  the 
distributor and exhibitors to have a contractual agreement on window (Cones 1997). Videos, 
for  example,  are  often  guaranteed  a  ninety  day  window  before  pay-per-view  release  to 
encourage retailers to buy more cassettes. Distributors and exhibitors may negotiate similar 
guarantees to improve the profitability of movies. 
Even  if  the  agreement  is  not  contracted,  there  are  reputation  effects  that  prevent  the 
distributor from reneging on its word. A long term relationship exists between exhibitors and 
distributors. Exhibitors often keep a distributor’s film on exhibition even if it isn’t doing good 
business, recognizing the fact that future films by that distributor may do well (Friedberg 
1992, Goldberg 1991). The trust in this relationship between exhibitors and distributors would 
be violated if distributors tried to decrease the theater window. 
(b) Intervention:  In  some  countries  the  government  may  enact  legislation  to  ensure  a  theater 
window. In France, the largest European film producer, the minimum theater window is 12 
months  by  law  (Dean,  1994).  Although  the  aim  of  these  laws  is  ostensibly  to  protect 
exhibitors, surprisingly, they protect distributors from harmful self-maximization as well. 
We want to find the optimal window given that commitment or intervention prevents a 
later deviation. The solution may be applied at the industry level by focusing on constant window 
strategies in which the window is the same in all periods and for all distributors. This is because 
the constant window solution may be the best industry-wide result that can be implemented by 
coordination. 
Proposition 6: The equilibrium window, ￿, for the case b=0 is given by the following:
(a) If Ns=0, the optimal window ￿*=0.
(b) If  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ++ ￿ <
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If this yields a negative value of ￿, or if the required inequality does not hold, then ￿*=0.
From knowing the discount rate, the video margin, the theater margin, the distribution S(￿) 
and the size of the loyal video segment, we can determine the optimal window using any iterative 
technique. The formula above is parsimonious and can be used as a rule of thumb. A first order 
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parameter  c  has  the  same  effect  as  r  within  each  movie,  i.e.,  it  tends  to  reduce ￿,  while  the 
parameter ￿ can lead to an increase or decrease in ￿ under suitable conditions. Comparative statics 
show that for larger video revenues either due to a larger video segment, larger switching segment, 
or higher video prices, there is a decrease in the length of the window, whereas with higher theater 
margins the window increases. An increase in the discount rate or an increase in the decay of 
awareness rate leads to shorter windows. 
Other  comparative  statics  reveals  that  the  optimal  window  and  profits  are  smaller for 
steeper sliding scales, b>0. Thus, the nature of the profit sharing scheme between exhibitors and 
distributors  does  have  an  effect  on  the  final  outcome.  It  makes  sense,  if  the  exhibitors  and 
distributors get together to negotiate for an industry standard, to set b=0, since this determines the 
maximum distributor and exhibition profits, and bargain later on how to split profits.
The value -S’’(￿)/S’(￿) may be interpreted as a measure of the impatience of the market, 
whereas the effective discount rate, (r+c), is a measure of the firm’s impatience. The technical 
requirement in Proposition 6(b), is the second order condition for maximum, and is a statement of 
the fact that customers must be relatively more impatient for price discrimination to be feasible. 
The following numerical example illustrates the use of Proposition 6: Let the theater ticket 
margin Pm = $5, the video rental margin Pv = $2.50, the effect of theater loyals ￿Nm￿0, the ratio of 
video loyals to switchers Nv/Ns = 2, the rate of return r = 15% per annum, and rate of decay of 
awareness c=5%. Let the fraction of video renters directly influenced by theater goers be ￿=2%. 
Let S(￿) = Nse
-a￿ be the distribution of switching, and let a = 65%. The second order condition can 
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Where, after inserting the remaining values, the right hand side is negative, and hence any positive 





















Which is satisfied for ￿=0.82 years, i.e., about a ten month window. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the effects of customer expectations on introduction timing strategies 
for new product versions through multiple channels. Firms take many considerations into account 
when deciding on the introduction time of new versions of existing products. A consideration that 
has been the primary focus of previous research is the trade-off between cannibalizing the revenue 
of the existing version versus postponing the revenue stream from the new version. The analysis in 
this paper reveals that, in addition to concerns about cannibalization, firms must consider the effect 
of their actions on customer expectations. 
In  the  movie  industry,  theaters  and  video  are the two versions of a movie distributed 
through two channels. Actions that predispose viewers to wait for the video rather than view the 
movie in theaters result in lower profits for the distributor since the theatrical version provides 
higher margins. It is shown that attempts to maximize profits with respect to the video introduction 
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earlier and earlier with each new movie till the video is ultimately released simultaneously with the 
movie. An important conclusion of this paper is that in the timing problem, the desire to limit 
cannibalization does not stop the decrease in timing of video release. 
A  foresighted  firm  may  not  be  able  to  avoid  the  problem  of  a  shrinking  sequential 
introduction window either. This occurs when customer expectations are formed not by the actions 
of a single firm but by industry behavior as a whole. A potential solution is that all firms in the 
industry should follow a common strategy. The behavior of firms in some industries is consistent 
with  this  observation.  Some  ways  in  which  this  coordination  takes  place  are  discussed. 
Subsequently,  the  paper  describes  how  the  optimal  constant  window  sequential  introduction 
strategy may be obtained. 
Despite these core contributions, other questions remain unanswered as of yet. An issue 
that has not been addressed in the paper is whether expectations of consumers are dependent on 
the quality or initial success of the movie. For example, from word-of-mouth it may have been 
realized early by the public that Titanic was a blockbuster, and the expectation for blockbusters 
may be that their window is longer than that of an ordinary movie. If this characterization of 
consumer behavior is correct then the model presented in this paper should be understood to apply 
to only one quality of movies. However, by repeating the same analysis for each quality, all the 
results hold except that a different window will now be obtained for each quality class. Depending 
on  industry  participants,  Proposition  6  may  still  be  used  to  determine  a  single  industry-wide 
optimal window. 
Our  analysis  is  limited  to  the  case  where  only  two  versions,  or  two  channels  of 
distribution,  are  available,  i.e.,  the  theater  and  video.  However,  the  general  problem  involves 
distribution through multiple channels. In the movie scenario, this means that the timing of entry 
into home video, cable, pay-per-view and networks should all be simultaneously determined. A 
related issue is to determine the optimal time of withdrawal of the product from a channel. As in 
the case of movies, all these decisions may not be in the hands of a single decision maker, and an 
investigation of the motivations of different channel members will be required.
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Proof of Proposition 1 
Maximize equation (3) with respect to ￿: The first order condition is
( )
0
( ) ( , ) [(1 ) ( , ) ( ){ ( ) ( , ) ( , ) }] 0
r e r c e e e e
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￿￿ + ￿￿ ++ + + + + ￿ ￿￿
  (A1)
For the equality to hold, we require m(￿
e,￿)>0, which is possible only when ￿n<￿
e
n. In equilibrium 
￿=￿
e. However, m(￿
e,￿)=0, since all switchers have seen the movie before they expected it to be 
removed from theater. The LHS then is negative for  0 r c +>. Thus, in equilibrium, ￿=￿
e=0.  
Proof of Proposition 2 
Let ￿n represent the distributor’s decision in the nth movie. Assume adaptive expectations, i.e. 
￿￿
e
n+1/￿￿n>0. From the proof of Proposition 1, if ￿n>0 then ￿n<￿
e
n, therefore, {￿n} is a decreasing 
sequence on a closed interval with lower bound and, therefore, it must converge to a unique point. 
At this point ￿=￿
e. Therefore, from Proposition 1, this point must be 0. Furthermore, this is the 
only  point  where  ￿=￿
e  from  Proposition  1,  hence,  this  is  the  unique  rational  expectations 
equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Differentiate the maximum value function obtained by incorporating the optimal value of ￿ from 
equation  (A1)  back  into  the  objective  function.  By  application  of  the  envelope  theorem  (i.e., 
dH(x,y)/dy = ￿H(x,y)/￿y when H is at a maximum w.r.t. x) we get
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The only negative factor is S’(￿
e). To check if it is ever large enough to make the RHS negative, 
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Substitute from (A3) into (A2) to get
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-(r+c)￿and Pm(t) > Pv everywhere in the relevant interval, therefore, the maximum profit 
increases with ￿
e.  
Proof of Proposition 4 
(a) The necessary condition for maximum is
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Where  Tn = Tn+1-Tn is the spacing between movies. We want to check when this condition is 
satisfied where ￿ is a constant for all movies. Dropping subscripts, and with equal spacing, 
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For  this  to  be  satisfied requires |￿￿(￿
e,￿)/￿￿
e| > |￿￿(￿
e,￿)/￿￿|, ￿ sufficiently large and r T
sufficiently small. 






rTn e is the total present value. For a monotonically decreasing window, expectations 
are  monotonically  decreasing.  Consider  the  maximum  profit  possible  at  each  of  these 





rTn e * .  This  exceeds  the  profits  of  the  profit 
stream with monotone decreasing window. Let ￿*>￿ till the (m-1)th movie, and have gained 
by an amount V over the constant window strategy. Summing the difference between strategies 
over the remaining terms, the difference is always greater than (￿-￿*(0,0))/(e
rm T-1)  which 
will be greater than V for sufficiently small r.  
Proof of Proposition 5 







rTn e ), ( ￿ ￿ where the nth movie is released at Tn. The 
necessary conditions for maximum is, as before,
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From Proposition 1, the first term is negative. The second term is, therefore, positive. This can 
also be seen directly. Expectations are adaptive, therefore, ￿￿
e
n+j/￿￿n is positive, and the proof 




n+j. is positive. When expectations are based 
upon the industry average, the value of ￿￿
e
n+j/￿￿n is small and gets smaller as the number of 
firms increases. A lower value of r increases the second term, and makes the first term less 
negative (see equation A1), and is required to maintain the equality. As the number of firm 
increases, ￿￿
e
n+j/￿￿n " 0 and the second term is very small. r must approach 0 to make the first 
term a very small negative value. (i) If c=0, then the first term is 0 when r=0. (ii) If c>0, then, 
from equation (A1), the first term can never become smaller than
￿ ++ + +
￿
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.
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(b) Assume an optimal single period deviation by a distributor, where each movie constitutes a 
period, while all other distributors maintain a constant window. Following the deviation, let 
the deviating distributor follow the same strategy as other distributors. Thus, all distributors 
have the same profits in all periods except in the deviation period in which the deviating 
distributor earns more, which completes the proof. It can also be seen that the profits of non-
deviating firms are smaller in each period since, similar to the proof of Proposition 3, d￿/d￿
e
is positive when ￿ is kept constant.
(c) If ￿
e is exogenous, each decision is independent and the maximization of the sum reduces to 
the sum of the maximum for each movie. Therefore, the result follows from Proposition 2.  
Proof of Proposition 6
The optimal steady state value of ￿ is obtained by maximizing 
( )
0 0
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, the profit expression may be rewritten 
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(a) Let b=0 and Ns=0. This implies that S(￿)=0, since S(￿)￿[0, Ns]. The expression e
-(r+c)￿PvNv is 
maximized at ￿=0.
(b) The first order condition is
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Let b=0. Rearranging yields the desired formula in the Proposition. The second order condition is 
obtained by differentiating ￿’(￿), and substituting the first order condition into the resulting 
expression, to get ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ++ ￿ <
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the second order condition to hold S’’(￿)>0 is sufficient since the second term is positive due to 
S’(￿)<0.  
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